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Abstract 
Government expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly 
significantly reduces 45-59 year old women’s informal care-giving affecting both the 
extensive and the intensive margin. Allowing for country fixed-effects and country-specific 
trends and correcting for attrition, the estimates - based on the European Community 
Household Panel - imply that a 1000 Euro increase in the government expenditure on formal 
residential care and home-help services for the elderly decreases the probability of informal 
care-giving outside of the caregiver’s household by 6 percentage points. Formal care 
substitutes for informal care that is undertaken outside of the carer’s own household, but does 
not substitute for intergenerational household formation. A simulation exercise shows that an 
increase in government formal care expenditure can be used to increase the labour force 
participation rates and a back-of-envelope cost-benefit calculation suggests the policy to be 
cost-effective. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The EU countries face the challenge of an ageing population, with the average elderly 
dependency ratio forecast to rise to 53% across the EU by 2050 (Eurostat, 2000). 
Furthermore, the ever increasing lifespan of the elderly mean that more resources need to be 
targeted at the elderly to help them, for example, to deal with everyday Activities of Daily 
Living or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living restrictions1. However, faced with tight 
budgets, a recent trend in the EU countries has been to re-direct transfers from public 
provision of elderly care, for example nursing homes, to informal care (Jenson and Jacobzone, 
2000).  
This expectation of increasing provision of informal care is in conflict with the European 
Employment Strategy and specifically the Lisbon Agenda which has set an ambitious target 
for raising female employment rates to 60% across the EU. Many EU countries have female 
labour force participation rates well below the 60% target rate2, however, this paper 
demonstrates that increasing government expenditure on formal residential and home-help for 
                                                 
1 ADLs are activities of daily living, which include tasks such as eating, bathing and dressing.  
IADLs are instrumental activities of daily living, which include tasks such as shopping, meal 
preparation, using the telephone and medication management. 
2 For background information on the trends and determinants of female labour supply in 
OECD countries, see Jaumotte (2003) or Employment in Europe 2004: recent trends and 
prospects (2004). 
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the elderly can significantly and cost-effectively increase the labour force participation rates 
of women across Europe by relieving their informal care burden3. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Informal elderly care is already a common phenomenon across the EU countries with its 
incidence ranging from 1-2% for 20-39 year olds peaking at over 10% (approximately 5 % for 
men) for over 50 year old women (Figure 1). The financial costs to the informal carers can be 
substantial, especially if the caregivers are forced to interrupt their careers or retire early in 
order to facilitate the provision of informal elderly care4. The short-run costs of reduced or 
interrupted labour supply are compounded by lower collected pension entitlements in the 
longer-run. Caring may also increase income inequality between social classes if 
disproportionate numbers of lower income households provide informal care to their elderly 
relatives or between men and women if the burden of care is disproportionately on women. 
Informal elderly care is a growing research topic, and while the financial costs to 
caregivers has not been studied, it is well established that informal care responsibilities affect 
the relationship between care-giving and employment (for example, Wolf and Soldo, 1994; 
Ettner, 1996; Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000). Another main branch of studies examines the 
bargaining process that determines family care arrangements (for example, Stern, 1995; 
Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Heidemann and Stern, 1999; Checkovich and Stern, 2002; Engers 
and Stern, 2002). Although many of these US papers have included state-specific Medicaid 
characteristics as independent variables, they do not specifically examine the impact of 
                                                 
3 For example, in Ireland the average tax revenue is calculated at €4,720 per person while the 
government expenditure on formal elderly care is assumed to rise from €443.53 to €918.19 
per person.   
4 Only 48% of 45-59 year old female carers work. 
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government expenditure on the long-term care on economic variables of interest. Instead 
Hoerger et al. (1996) and Pezzin et al. (1996) examine the economic impacts of government 
assistance for elderly care. 28% of Medicaid long-term care expenditure is spent on home and 
community services (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000) and this is found 
to increase the likelihood of the elderly living independently, rather than in a shared 
household or a nursing home. 
Whereas eligibility for Medicaid is based on income and personal resources, the EU 
countries used in the analysis fund elderly care at the national level regardless of personal 
circumstances. Most countries fund both formal and informal care and the analysis exploits 
the different levels and trends in the funding of long-term care across Europe5. Specifically 
this paper examines the relationship between formal, government provided care and informal 
care provided by our survey individual. The findings indicate that government expenditure on 
formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly significantly reduces 45-59 year 
old women’s informal care-giving on the extensive and the intensive margin. A simulation 
exercise shows that an increase in government formal care expenditure has a positive effect 
on the employment levels of 45-59 year old women across Europe, which is of policy 
relevance in attaining the EU employment targets. 
2 DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
To recap, the aim of this research is to examine how government expenditure on formal 
elderly care affects the likelihood of informal elderly care. This is achieved by analysing 
several countries with different levels of expenditure on the formal provision of in-kind, 
                                                 
5 There is similar large variation across the US states; the median annual Medicaid 
expenditure on home and community services is $1180 per person age 65 or over in New 
York and $29 in Mississippi (Kane et al., 1998).  
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institutional and/or at home elderly care. Ideally, this type of research would use a long panel 
spanning several decades, however, this paper uses the second best option, the eight waves 
(1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The advantage of using 
the ECHP is that it is a large scale comparative panel study among the EU-15 that was 
designed to develop comparable social indicators across the EU and covers a range of topics 
related to labour market activity and demographic characteristics at the individual level.  
Prior to describing the econometric method used in this analysis, we shall take a closer 
look at the ECHP data. In the first wave of interviews in 1994, data were collected for 12 EU 
member states: Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Austria entered the sampling 
frame in 1995, Finland in 1996 and Sweden in 1997. The choice of countries used in the 
subsequent analysis is guided by the availability of data for each country. Luxembourg and 
Sweden are not included because the information on elderly care is missing. Furthermore, 
Germany and the UK have not collected the ECHP data for waves 4-86. Hence the analysis 
for the UK uses the national BHPS panel for waves 1-8. The data will be discussed in more 
detail after a brief look at the econometric method.    
The econometric method used to analyse the impact of government expenditure on formal 
elderly care on informal care of the elderly relies on two different analyses. The first model 
relies on a discrete response model P( y = 1 | s, x ), where y refers to the extensive margin of 
participating in informal elderly care activities, s is the government expenditure on formal 
care and x includes individual, household and country effects that may affect y. Prior to 
examining the independent variables in more detail, we shall examine the second type of 
                                                 
6 In the German SOEP sample, care-giving is reported to be only 0.6% of the sample, which is 
significantly lower than that reported in the German ECHP. 
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model used. This takes the form of a multinomial response model P( y = j | s, x ) where j = 
0,1,2. The mutually exclusive choices j in this analysis divide y into three parts: no informal 
care activities, informal care undertaken only within respondent’s own household and 
informal care undertaken only outside respondent’s household. 
Naturally the use of panel data would allow us to estimate the models discussed 
previously in a random effects framework, however, partly7 due to the assumption of strict 
exogeneity inherent in the random effects discrete response models, the subsequent analysis is 
based on partial maximum likelihood estimation. This estimator simply maximises the partial 
log likelihood ℓi ( θ ), where , across all 
individuals i. The advantage of this estimator is that it is consistent and asymptotically 
normal. The estimates of all empirical models include a correction for correlation of residuals 
across i over time.  
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The independent variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 1 all of which, except 
for government formal benefit expenditure, are derived from the ECHP. The variable for 
government formal benefit expenditure is collected from the OECD Social Expenditure 
database (OECD, 2004) and provides country and year specific government expenditure data 
on old age in-kind benefits for residential care/home-help services in Euros per capita of 
population over 65 years of age expressed in 2001 price levels. The main dependent variable 
of interest, CARE, takes value 1 for interviewees who report looking after (without pay) a 
person who needs help because of old age, disability or illness other than a child. The ECHP 
also includes detailed information on household and personal characteristics that are likely 
 
7 A second reason for adopting the particular method of estimation concerns attrition 
correction, which is discussed at a later stage. 
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determinants of the informal care decision. Controls that are included in the analysis include: 
age (linear and quadratic), dummies for presence of pre-teen (age 0-12) and teenage children 
(age 13-15), dichotomous variables for a second or a higher level of education, and for very 
bad/bad health, an indicator of marital status (married, separated/divorced, widowed, never 
married) and household size as well as country specific trends and country dummies. The 
country-specific variables capture the incidence of and the divergence in the market and 
voluntary sector provision of elderly care between the sample countries. The net annual 
household income variable is expressed in Euros and is divided by the equivalised household 
size according to a modified OECD scale that gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to 
other adults and 0.3 to each child living in the household. 
 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Attrition in the ECHP is considerable (Peracchi, 2002) and can lead to invalid inference. 
To test whether attrition biases the empirical estimates, we use a test proposed by Verbeek 
and Nijman (1992). The test comprises of including the following variables in the regressions 
for an unbalanced panel: 1) the number of waves the individual participates, 2) a binary 
indicator for participation in all waves and 3) a binary indicator for not responding in the 
following wave. These indicator variables should not enter the model significantly under the 
hypothesis of no selectivity bias. The results of these regressions confirm that attrition is not 
random8. 
The subsequent estimates allow for attrition by adopting an inverse probability weighted 
estimator (IPW) within the framework described previously (Wooldridge, 2002). This method 
assumes that attrition can be treated as ignorable non-response conditional on characteristics 
observed in the first wave. Specifically, I estimate a discrete response model for response 
                                                 
8 Available from the author upon request. 
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versus non-response at each wave of the panel using the initial sample of individuals observed 
in the first wave. The inverse of the fitted probabilities from these models is subsequently 
used to weight the observations in the final models.  
The subsequent analysis uses a sub-sample chosen according to the individual 
characteristics at the first date of interview. I restrict the sample to include individuals aged 
between 18 and 59 years inclusively, who are not reported to be in (early) retirement. 
Observations are excluded from the analysis if they have missing information on the level of 
education or participate in education (20,081 observations), gender (1 observation), marital 
status (507 observations), household income (11,040 observations), location of informal 
caring (97 observations) or have discrepancies in the informal care variables (452 
observations). This leaves us a sample size of 474,660 (244,165 females and 230,495 males) 
or 87,178 individuals who are observed for six waves on average. Only 34.4% are surveyed 
for the full eight waves. 
4 RESULTS 
This section presents the results on the impact of government formal care expenditure, 
first, on the incidence of informal care and finds significant negative effects for 45-59 year 
old women. Second, it is shown that the formal care substitutes for informal care that is 
undertaken outside of the carer’s own household, hence formal care does not substitute for 
intergenerational household formation. Finally, a simulation exercise shows that an increase 
in government formal care expenditure has a positive effect on the employment levels of 45-
59 year old women across Europe, which is of policy relevance in attaining the EU 
employment targets. This section finishes with a summary of robustness checks that show that 
the results do not change with different specifications or samples.  
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First of all, we estimate the impact of government formal care expenditure on the 
incidence of informal care. Table 2 reports the marginal effect of the coefficient of s in model 
P( y = 1 | s, x ), where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable for the extensive 
margin of informal caring for an elderly or a disabled adult. The model is estimated for the 
full sample (column 1) and for different age groups defined in the column heading (columns 2 
to 7) for women only9. Although the parameter estimate is provided only for the government 
expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly, the regressions 
also control for the variables described and summarised in Table 1 as well as country fixed 
effects and country-specific time trends.  
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for women on the impact of government expenditure on formal residential care 
and home-help services for the elderly on the incidence of informal care are reported in Table 
2. As expected due to the low incidence of informal caring in the younger age groups, the 
government expenditure on formal in-kind care does not significantly influence the decision 
to partake in informal caring activities for the younger cohorts. Examining the ten year 
cohorts in the first instance, we can observe that the results are significant for age group 50-59 
year old women. Although Graph 1 indicates that the likelihood of caring increases 
considerably from age 40 onwards, the results in Table 2 show that the government 
expenditure on formal care influences informal care only from age 45 onwards. Since the 
mean age of entering motherhood across Europe was approximately 25 years in 1950 
(Gustafsson, 2001), the parents of 45-59 year old women would be approaching the age when 
the prevalence of ADL restrictions rises considerably (see, for example, Winblad et al. 2001).  
                                                 
9 The results for men are never significantly different from zero and hence are not reported in 
this table (the results are available upon request). 
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The results in Table 2 indicate that a 1000 Euro per capita increase in the government 
expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly decreases the 
probability of informal care-giving by 4-6 percentage points for a sample of European women 
aged 45-59. A further analysis separating the government formal benefit expenditure into its 
two main components, accommodation for the elderly and assistance in carrying daily tasks 
for the elderly, does not indicate that either category on its own accounts for the main result 
(results not reported). Results for the intensive margin of informal care also indicate that the 
formal care expenditure decreases the hours spent on informal care-giving by nearly two 
hours per week10. The public sector care therefore substitutes for the informal sector. 
Several US studies have found that publicly provided home care increases the probability 
of the elderly living independently (Hoerger et al., 1996 and Pezzin et al., 1996) and 
decreases the probability of living in an intergenerational household or a nursing home 
(Pezzin et al., 1996). Although these hypotheses cannot be tested with our data, it is possible 
to examine whether the public in-kind care provision substitutes for at home care or for 
informal care outside of the carer’s own household. A multinomial logit for a sample of 45-59 
year old women with the same set of independent variables as in the previous regressions 
indicates that government in-kind elderly care does not significantly reduce informal care-
giving at the carer’s own household. However, the odds of caring for an elderly or a disabled 
adult outside the carer’s household is significantly reduced due to higher government 
expenditure on formal care (with a marginal effect of -0.0210 and standard error of 0.0121). 
Separating government formal benefit expenditure into its two component parts, 
accommodation for the elderly and assistance in carrying out daily tasks for the elderly, 
                                                 
10 The result is obtained by OLS with the usual controls, IPW correction and corrected 
standard errors. They are available from the author on request. 
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indicates that this result is driven by the government expenditure on formal residential care 
(marginal effect -0.0082 significant at 5% level of significance) rather than home-help. In 
other words, the higher the government expenditure on formal residential care (nursing 
homes), the less likely is the informal care provision, which is a very intuitive result. What is 
interesting is that formal home-help does not substitute for informal care-giving11.  
Since formal care expenditure does not significantly affect informal care-giving in 
intergenerational households, it can be suspected that the results are driven by a sub-sample of 
countries where intergenerational households may be more prevalent. This possibility is 
examined by estimating the model separately for a group of southern countries (Italy, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal) with strong traditions compared to the centre and northern parts of Europe 
(Reher, 1998). Table 3 indicates that southern countries do not seem to be driving the results 
as the government expenditure on formal care does not significantly affect the informal care-
giving probability either at own household or at an other (most likely the elderly/disabled 
person’s) household.  
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 also reports results separately for countries that can be viewed as welfare states. 
Welfare state definition in this case includes countries that have a minimum welfare 
expenditure of 25% of GDP according to OECD (2001) figures. This definition includes the 
following countries: Denmark, France, Belgium, Austria and Finland. The results for this 
group of countries are in the column “welfare 1” in Table 3 and indicate that government 
                                                 
11 There is no significant effect on the hours of informal caring. Hence this result may indicate 
that formal home-help does not satisfy the need for companionship as perceived either by the 
carer or the elderly.  
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expenditure on in kind elderly benefits does not significantly affect the probability of informal 
care-giving.  
However, a closer look at the data on the government per capita expenditure on in kind 
elderly care reveals that the countries that have high welfare expenditure as percentage of 
GDP do not in all cases have a high expenditure on old age benefits in kind for residential 
care / home-help services. Figure 2 reveals the per capita expenditure in Euros on in kind old 
age benefits is highest in Denmark, Netherlands, UK, Ireland and Finland. The Danish per 
capita expenditure of over 4,000 Euros is well above the rest and is explained by government 
policy of caring for the elderly and the disabled in their own homes rather than at residential 
homes. According to the Danish government information, the high expenditure is explained 
by an increasing number of private dwellings for the elderly with special facilities and varying 
degrees of services and free home help and services for the elderly (see, for example, Stuart 
and Weinrich, 2001). Column “welfare 2” includes the welfare 1 countries + Italy, 
Netherlands and Greece and the results show the same significant negative effect as for the 
whole sample, that is, formal care expenditure reduces the probability of informal caring 
outside the carer’s own household. The robustness of this finding is tested by excluding 
Denmark from the whole sample and the results presented in Table 3 column headed “whole 
sample 2” show a significant effect indicating that a 1000 Euro per capita increase in the 
government expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly 
decreases the probability of informal care-giving outside of the caregiver’s household by 6 
percentage points for a sample of European women aged 45-5912.    
 [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
12 This result is also robust to excluding Denmark from the Welfare 2 sample. 
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Increasing the labour market participation rates of people close to the official retirement 
age lies at the heart of the European Employment Strategy. Therefore it is of interest to 
examine the potential effect of an increase in government formal care expenditure on the 
employment levels of 45-59 year old women across Europe. The previous analysis showed 
that formal care substitutes for informal care, in particular for the more time-consuming care 
outside the carer’s own household. Hence the care-givers should have more time to allocate to 
other activities including employment.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
This analysis assesses whether an increase in government expenditure on formal, in kind 
elderly care has an effect on the labour force participation of 45-59 year old women by 
reducing the need for informal care-giving13. This aim is particularly important in the 
countries identified by the Lisbon Agenda. According to the ECHP the following countries 
fall below the EU target of 60% of women in employment (for the age group 45-59): Spain, 
Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Austria (see Table 4). Figure 3 
summarises the simulated labour force participation rates for two different policy reforms: an 
increase in government formal elderly care expenditure, first, to the average EU expenditure 
on formal elderly care excluding the clear outlier Denmark (€169.52) and, second, to the 
average EU expenditure on formal elderly care including Denmark (€474.66) if the 
expenditure was below these figures (see Table 4). The results are striking for all the countries 
as raising the formal elderly care expenditure to the average EU expenditure on formal elderly 
care would increase the labour force participation rate of 45-59 year old women by between 9 
and 13 percentage points.   
                                                 
13 The model for labour force participation includes the same control variables as the previous 
models. An alternative specification with estimated hourly wage does not change the results. 
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[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The final part of the analysis assesses the robustness of the results. Alternative 
specifications including the estimated wage are estimated for all models but this does not alter 
the conclusions. Furthermore, since the analysis relies to a large extent on the government 
expenditure on formal care variable, it is confirmed that there is no reverse causality that is 
the incidence of informal care does not have a significant effect on the level of government 
expenditure on formal care.  
Previous checks have already established that specific groups of countries do not drive the 
results. Furthermore, dropping one country at a time the results do not seem overly sensitive 
to the exclusion of any specific country. We also explore the sensitivity of the results to the 
exclusion of the country-specific trends as well as inclusion of higher order country trends. 
All of the robustness checks support the main conclusions: increase in the government 
expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly decreases the 
probability of informal care-giving and can help increase the female labour force participation 
rates of women aged 45-59. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrates that increasing government expenditure on formal residential and 
home-help for the elderly can significantly increase the labour force participation rates of 
women across Europe by relieving their informal care burden. 
We find significant negative effects of government formal care expenditure on the 
incidence of informal care for 45-59 year old women across Europe. Allowing for country 
and time fixed effects and country-specific trends and correcting for attrition, the 12 country 
analysis using the ECHP implies that a 1000 Euro per capita increase in the government 
expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly decreases the 
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probability of informal care-giving outside of the caregiver’s household by 6 percentage 
points for a sample of European women aged 45-59. Formal care is found to substitute for 
informal care that is undertaken outside of the carer’s own household, therefore formal care 
does not substitute for intergenerational household formation. A simulation exercise shows 
that an increase in government formal care expenditure has a positive effect on the 
employment levels of 45-59 year old women across Europe, which is of policy relevance in 
attaining the EU employment targets. These results are robust to several alternative 
specifications.  
Measures to help women to combine caring responsibilities with labour market 
participation may provide the crucial policy instruments in many countries to attain the 
European Commission target of 60% employment rates for women to help tackle the ageing 
problem. 
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Figure 1: Informal elderly care 
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Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Old age benefits in kind for residential care / home-help services in Euros per capita 
of population over 65 years of age (2001 prices) 
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Figure 3: Simulated impact of an increase in government expenditure on formal, in kind 
elderly care on labour force participation, women 45-59 (ECHP 1994-2001)  
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Notes: LFP denotes the observed labour force participation rate. The model prediction is good 
with the following difference between the baseline prediction from the observed value: 
Austria 1.3594, Belgium 0.1364, Greece 0.9528, Ireland -0.6043, Italy -1.2302, Netherlands 
0.5494, Portugal 0.6082, Spain -0.1013. SOCX+EU AVG 1 refers to the simulated labour 
force participation rate when the government expenditure on formal elderly care has been 
increased by the EU sample average without Denmark (€169.52) if the expenditure was below 
this figure. SOCX+EU AVG 2 refers to the simulated labour force participation rate when the 
government expenditure on formal elderly care has been increased by the EU sample average 
with Denmark (€474.66) if the expenditure was below this figure. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
 Definition Whole 
sample 
Women aged 
45-59 
Caring 1 if caring for an elderly or disabled adult  0.0350      
(0.1839) 
0.0882     
(0.2836) 
Location of caring 0 if not caring for an elderly or disabled 
adult, 1 if caring within own household 
only, 2 if caring outside own household 
only 
0) 
0.9422    
(0.2335) 
1) 
0.0252    
(0.1568) 
2)  
0.0326    
(0.1777) 
0) 
0.8727    
(0.3333) 
1) 
0.0554    
(0.2288) 
2) 
0.0719    
(0.2583) 
Government 
formal care 
expenditure  
Old age benefits in kind for residential care 
/ home-help services in Euros per capita of 
population over 65 years of age (2001 
prices) ‘000 
0.3349  
(0.8746) 
0.3361 
(0.8642) 
Age Age of individual 39.3604     
(10.7109) 
51.3262 
(4.1999) 
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.6630 
(0.4727) 
0.8089     
(0.3932) 
Separated 1 if separated, 0 otherwise 0.0130     
(0.1131) 
0.0166 
(0.1277) 
Divorced 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise 0.0395     
(0.1947) 
0.0661 
(0.2485) 
Widowed 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 0.0150     
(0.1216) 
0.0559 
(0.2296) 
Single 1 if never married, 0 otherwise 0.2695 
(0.4437)     
0.0526 
(0.2231) 
University 1 if highest schooling level is 3rd level or 
above, 0 otherwise 
0.1933 
(0.3949) 
0.1436     
(0.3507)          
Secondary level 
education 
1 if highest schooling level is 2nd stage of 
secondary level, 0 otherwise 
0.3324     
(0.4711) 
0.2204 
(0.4145) 
Compulsory level 
education 
1 if highest schooling level is less than 2nd 
stage of secondary level 
0.4743     
(0.4993) 
0.6361 
(0.4811) 
Young kids 1 if children aged strictly less than 13 
present in household, 0 otherwise 
0.3070     
(0.4612) 
0.0880 
(0.2833) 
Teen kids 1 if children aged greater than 13 present in 
household, 0 otherwise  
0.0898    
(0.2859) 
0.1045 
(0.3059) 
Bad health 1 if self-assessed health is reported poor or 
very poor, 0 otherwise 
0.0488     
(0.2154) 
0.0967 
(0.2955) 
Foreign born 1 if born outside of the country of 
residence 
0.0312     
(0.1738) 
0.0302 
(0.1711) 
Household size Number of people in household including 
respondent 
3.5758      
(1.4331) 
3.2557     
(1.4032) 
Household 
income 
Net annual equivalised household income 
in Euros (2001 prices) 
14964.98      
(9438.23) 
16293.77 
(10460.20) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table 2: Impact of government expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly on the incidence of informal care 
(ECHP 1994-2001) 
WOMEN 18-59 18-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  45-59 40-59 
        
Government formal care 
expenditure 
-0.0030   
(0.0051) 
-0.0103  
(0.0128) 
0.010   
(0.0064) 
0.0005   
(0.0123) 
-0.0557 **
(0.0243) 
 -0.0400 **
(0.0164)     
  -0.0182   
(0.0122) 
        
Number of observations 244,165 51,885*      70,329 68,940 52,963 86460 121903
Pseudo R2 0.1418 0.0766 0.1490 0.1100 0.0586   0.0445 0.0433
        
Notes:  Table reports marginal effects. 48 observations in category widowed are dropped for 18-29 age group due to collinearity. The regressions 
control for: government formal care expenditure, age and age squared, dummies for marital status [married (omitted), separated/divorced, 
widowed, never married], dummies for highest qualification level [university or above (omitted), senior secondary level, compulsory level], a 
dummy for presence of pre-teen children (age 0-12), a dummy for presence of teenage children (13-15), a dummy for self-assessed poor/very 
poor health, a dummy for foreign born, household size and net equivalised household income. 
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Table 3: Impact of government expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the elderly on the location of informal care, 
women 45-59 (ECHP 1994-2001) 
 Whole sample Southern Welfare 1 Welfare 2 Whole sample 2 
 Own
household 
 Other 
household 
Own 
household 
Other 
household 
Own 
household 
Other 
household 
Own 
household 
Other 
household 
Own 
household 
Other 
household 
           
Government 
formal care 
expenditure 
-0.0245      
(0.0224)    
-0.0210 *  
(0.0121)    
-0.0074      
(0.0025) 
-0.0029      
(0.0018) 
0.0031      
(0.0140)    
-0.0034      
(0.0165)    
0.0024      
(0.0128) 
-0.0433 **  
(0.0218) 
-0.0448      
(0.0316) 
-0.0601 **  
(0.0241) 
          
Number of 
observations 
86,460     40,157 25,351 30,114 82,491
Pseudo R2      0.0639 0.0336 0.0423 0.0477 0.0632
         
Notes:  Table reports marginal effects. Southern refers to Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Welfare 1 refers to: Denmark, France, Belgium, 
Austria and Finland. Welfare 2 refers to welfare 1 countries + Italy, Netherlands and Greece. Whole sample refers to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and whole sample 2 is the same as former except for 
Denmark. The regressions control for: government formal care expenditure, age and age squared, dummies for marital status [married (omitted), 
separated/divorced, widowed, never married], dummies for highest qualification level [university or above (omitted), senior secondary level, 
compulsory level], a dummy for presence of pre-teen children (age 0-12), a dummy for presence of teenage children (13-15), a dummy for self-
assessed poor/very poor health, a dummy for foreign born, household size and net equivalised household income. 
Table 4: Government expenditure on formal residential care and home-help services for the 
elderly, average Euros per capita over years 1994-2001 (OECD) and labour force 
participation rates, women 45-59 (ECHP 1994-2001) 
 
Government expenditure on formal residential care 
and home-help services for the elderly LFP
Spain 0.83 0.30453
Ireland 432.88 0.33992
Greece 0.18 0.42004
Netherlands 489.59 0.43623
Italy 0.06 0.44105
Belgium 0.11 0.53166
Portugal 0.50 0.54706
Austria 39.55 0.56151
France 28.03 0.60386
UK 638.39 0.64571
Finland 186.74 0.84036
Denmark 4,136.08 0.84203
Notes: Table reports the means of labour force participation from the sample of women aged 
45-59 from ECHP 1994-2001. 
